


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2022 AÑO DEL LIDERAZGO,
LA MORAL COMBATIVA Y LA
CONTUNDENCIA OPERACIONAL



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2022 AÑO DEL LIDERAZGO,
LA MORAL COMBATIVA Y LA
CONTUNDENCIA OPERACIONAL





EJÉRCITO NACIONAL
PATRIA HONOR LEALTAD



CEDOE
CENTRO DE DOCTRINA
DEL EJÉRCITO

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The published terms are in line with the established definitions in the Fundamental Reference Manual of the Army MFRE 1-02 "Military Terms and Symbols". This clarification was necessary because in some cases these words can be found defined in dictionaries or in other documents with different meanings that do not include the exact interpretation in the military context.

EDITORIAL



On 2022 Colombia and the National Army face great challenges in democratic issues, since presidential and legislative elections are planned - an exercise held every four years in which Colombians adults, those who are part of the electoral census, residents of the country or abroad and also foreigners residing in the country, can exercise their right to vote.

To this end, the national government is actually working on the integration of collaborative efforts from the Ministries of Defense and the Interior, also of State entities and organizations —such as the National Registry of Civil Status— and of the municipalities and departments, and ordered that the Democracy Plan for 2022 be executed in four phases: inter-institutional coordination, operational planning, operational management and redistribution of resources.

In addition, the military doctrine of the National Army contemplates four characteristics that legitimize the actions of its members: military knowledge, honor, esprit de corps and ethical values —which allow to reach the constitutional mandate.

Thus, taking into account the military and academic character —which instructs in the spectrum of military sciences, military knowledge and thought, critical analysis and understanding—, Military Expertise want to publish this edition to align its nature with the electoral fairs that will take place and highlight the complexity of the operational environment that lies ahead.

Consequently, you will find articles whose intention is to establish the way in which military doctrine becomes the support for the conduct of military operations —which, in the current context, must be developed in a joint - coordinated and inter-institutional manner—, with the purpose of allowing the exercise of public rights and freedoms in accordance with constitutional precepts.

In accordance, the superior command has determined that 2022 will be the year of leadership, combative morale and operational forcefulness. These premises reiterate to the members of the institution the importance of respecting the principles and values —basic rules of conduct for their actions—, maximum professionalism, capacity, responsibility and concentration, as key factors to maintain high standards of quality and increase the legitimacy indexes achieved during decades of compliance with the constitutional duty.

EXPERTICIA MILITAR

READERS' COMMENTS

The Army Doctrine Center is the think tank and fundamental axis on which the fulfillment of the mission is articulated; in this sense, it has a direct impact on the set of tactics, techniques and procedures of all military units during the conduct of military operations.

Additionally, it is the cradle of the Army's professional magazine: *Military Expertise*. Publication through which prominent experts on military issues—at the national and international level—provide their insights and analyze doctrine, strategy and management of issues related to science and military-academic knowledge, with enriching articles that invite future readers to expand their knowledge and strengthen decisive concepts about what is related to their vocation and the importance of fulfilling the constitutional duty.

MAJOR JAVIER BETANCOURT NOVA
CEDE6 Project Officer

The Army Doctrine Center (CEDOE) has emerged and has established itself as an organizational structure of great impact for the National Army. Precisely, this unit is in charge of processing all the military knowledge and experience that comes from an institution committed to asymmetric military operations; in fact, this wealth of information is filtered by an interdisciplinary team and turned into manuals that contain principles, tactics, techniques, procedures, terms and symbols by which the actions of the nation's land force are guided during military operations.

That is why commanders at different levels and, in general, all officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers are expected to disseminate the knowledge acquired as a result of the lessons learned and the experiences lived in military operations and in training courses, training and qualification that are carried out annually. This is known as new knowledge management and has been contained in the military doctrine, which allows operational

success and, as a consequence, the strengthening of the image of the National Army.

On the other hand, *Military Expertise* is the dissemination body authorized by the National Army to share with the military community (active and retired) those topics that have a great doctrinal load and are related to the profession of arms. In this sense, each edition of this magazine serves as a means to update its readers about issues of their professional work and the way in which the National Army progresses through serious, interesting and rigorous articles of national and international scope.

Finally, it only remains for me to invite the military academic community and the knowledge society to read *Military Expertise* with passion, devotion and with a high institutional vocation, since it concentrates important advances in the military field and details the planning, preparation, execution and evaluation of operational missions at all levels of military command; and, in turn, I extend recognition to the team that makes possible each edition through which the doctrine's update is transmitted and the essence of the military profession is proudly preserved.

MG. (RA) EMIRO JOSÉ BARRIOS JIMÉNEZ
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MBA from Adolfo Ibáñez University*

2022, YEAR OF LEADERSHIP, COMBATIVE MORALE AND OPERATIONAL FORCEFULNESS

For decades, the National Army has educated and trained all of its members with the purpose of being faithful to its principles, values and our main reason: to serve the country.

There have been multiple changes in the environment in terms of security and defense, the task of safeguarding the defense of sovereignty, independence, the integrity of the national territory and the constitutional order has become increasingly difficult, and has demanded greater attention to the quality standards established at national and international levels, in order to increase the legitimacy indexes before the Colombian people.

Therefore, for 2022, the Army slogan is based on leadership, combative morale and operational forcefulness, since they are the fundamental basis to satisfy the challenging needs of Colombians and to be able to overcome any situation that puts them at risk.

In this sense, Colombia is the axis and training will be the key to enhance the intrinsic leadership of all those heroes who gave themselves body and soul to the institution. Precisely, Army doctrine defines such leadership as "the ability to influence people, providing direction, purpose and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization." Taking into consideration the leader's virtues that exist in "any individual who, by virtue of the role assumed or the responsibility assigned, inspires and influences other people to achieve institutional goals."

This is how military leaders carry out actions, focus thinking, make decisions supporting the institution, order ideas and



General
Eduardo Enrique Zapateiro Altamiranda
Colombian National Army Commander

This is how military leaders carry out actions, focus thinking, make decisions supporting the institution, order ideas and respect democracy as the only way to consolidate security and defense of which they are guarantors.

respect democracy as the only way to consolidate security and defense of which they are guarantors. However, it is not just a matter of expressing intentions, but of engaging fundamental elements (such as the unification of information, mission-type command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment and protection), with the objective to reach a desired end state through clear orders and requirements at the time of fulfilling the assigned mission.

On the one hand, leadership has the attributes framed in character and intellect, which together, refer to empathy, the spirit of the warrior, service and discipline, military and professional bearing, the maintenance of self-confidence and increased physical and mental agility, with the intention of a more robust experience, innovation, esprit de corps and results.

On the other hand, combative morale is based on esprit de corps, that winning spirit that highlights professional, energetic, committed soldiers with high standards of excellence in all their actions; contains essential elements such as military culture, traditions, perseverance, morale, pride, momentum, and commitment (as banners of military art and science); and maintains a collective identity of all members of the Force, insofar as the shared understanding and respect for the military profession and for the leaders of both the present and the past, who shared their expertise and achieved the victories of yesterday and always.

Finally, it is necessary to highlight that the noblest duty of the soldier is to watch over the country; a fact that is reflected through operational forcefulness, that is, in the consolidation of gains, conceived in military doctrine as those "activities that make any temporary operational success permanent and establish the conditions for a stable and sustainable environment that allows a transition of control to the legitimate civil authorities". The foregoing provides security and protection to the population through the reinforcement and integration of the partners of the unified action (governmental and non-governmental entities) to prevent conflict and configure the operational environment.

This 2022 brings greater challenges and demands to all members of the National Army and, in turn, demands that they give the best of each one in order to strengthen knowledge, expertise, training, professionalism and commitment, which will lead to achieving victories in challenging scenarios.

Homeland, honor, loyalty!

ALIGNED WITH THE INSTITUTION'S PLANS

“The prospect is a message of hope for all those who want to take their destiny in their hands. To imagine a different future is to begin to change the present. The dream makes reality come true”

Michel Godet



Brigadier General

Miller Vladimir Nossa Rojas

*Commander of the Education and Doctrine
Command of the National Army*

Professional in Military Sciences and Business Administration, specialist in Security Administration and Military Resources Administration and Master in Strategy and Geopolitics and Security and National Defense.

During his military career, he has held positions as commander of the Third Brigade, commander of the 86th Counter guerrilla Battalion, organic of the 12th Mobile Brigade, Director of the 4th Training Center, commander of the Mobile Brigade No. 14, director of the “Pedro Pascasio Martínez” School for Professional Soldiers, military attaché in the Colombian Military Attaché Office before the Government of the United States, Director of the Directorate for the Application of Transparency and Ethics Standards of the Armed Forces General Command and head of the Department of Control, Arms Trade, Ammunition, Explosives and Controlled Chemical Substances.

Higher command has determined that 2022 will be the year of leadership, combative morale and operational forcefulness, which makes sense given that the National Army has been constituted as a modern, advanced and adaptable land force in volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous contexts (VUCA), as well as various operational environments —understood as “a composition of conditions, circumstances and influences that affects the use of capabilities and weigh on the commander’s decisions” (National Army of Colombia 2017a [4-21]).

The foregoing, added to knowledge and experience, guarantees the conduct of military operations in current and future scenarios; however, to reduce uncertainty, it is necessary to carry out risk analysis, preventive and long-term strategies, present diagnoses, surveillance, monitoring and control of processes and procedures and the update of a doctrinal construction.

Hence, the Army Education and Doctrine Command is constituted as a distinguished unit for excellence in processes and as a fundamental pillar in charge of developing skills and imparting knowledge to the members of the institution, through its twenty formation and training schools, two centers, three directorates and a training brigade.

Leadership contains attributes framed in character, presence, and intellect, and some competencies, such as trust, example, fostering esprit de corps, contributing to the development of others, and managing the military profession to achieve results or the desired final state (Colombian National Army, 2017b [1-24]).

Therefore, it is about motivating, directing, assuming roles and responsibilities, meeting goals and being able to carry out an excellent decision-making process that leads to success in the military and in the personal field. In this sense, the leadership imparted from the CEDOC is transcendental for the development of activities in the area of operations, since they usually require greater demand, preparation, training, professionalization of the Force and other skills and capabilities regarding threats.

The combative morale is that feeling that is rooted in the skin, the conscience, the self being, and that is consigned in the esprit de corps —that “winning spirit within the Army profession, integrated in the culture, sustained by traditions, which foster cohesive and trusting units with the value of preserving the institution” (National Army of Colombia, 2017c [6-2]) and with the purpose of serving the nation—. However, none of the above could be done without the foundation of the military profession: trust.

It is the certainty that someone can be depended on for their character, ability, strength, and truthfulness, such trust being the essence of the Army’s effectiveness [...] Confidence in oneself, among soldiers, between soldiers and their commanders, between the soldiers themselves, their families



The combative morale is that feeling that is rooted in the skin, the conscience, the self being, and that is consigned in the esprit de corps —that “winning spirit within the Army profession, integrated in the culture, sustained by traditions, which foster cohesive and trusting units with the value of preserving the institution”

and the Army, and between the National Army and the Colombian people is highly necessary; but, above all, absolute trust and faith in God (Colombian National Army, 2017c [3-5]).

Now, the operational forcefulness begins with the noble work of the soldier to watch over his homeland, whose fundamental basis is to maintain and expand the sine qua non skills to conduct military operations based on compliance with the law, the doctrinal approach and humanistic training in the dimensions of being, knowing, doing and coexisting.

Along with the institutional campaign for 2022, slogans such as prudence (Colombian National Army, 2017c [2-9]), justice, strength (2017c [2-3]) and temperance become factors that, from the Education and Doctrine Command, are established as the guidelines that their attached units must follow and that are articulated from the doctrine itself: act with integrity, create working alliances, build trust, be innovative, persevere and smile. They are “the deep and superior convictions on which the actions of the soldier and of all the members that make up the institution are based” (National Army of Colombia, 2017c [2-9]).

We are facing a magnificent opportunity to build the future, keeping an adaptation to an environment that demands efficiency, training, conviction, poise in operational situations and, above all, commitment to safeguard—in a coherent, informed and doctrinal

manner—the most important that has been entrusted to the soldier: the nation.

This work is not one person's job; on the contrary, it is the result of the work of a great team that bases its actions on trust, values, principles, knowledge management and the application and dissemination of military doctrine as the basis of military operations.

Finally, it is imperative to emphasize that the Education and Doctrine Command is aligned with one of the most important events of this year: the legislative and executive elections. In accordance, there is a great effort directed towards the training of those men and women who are directly committed to all the initiatives that guarantee the good performance of the activities that include the mechanisms of democratic and citizen participation.

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DISDI

DIRECCIÓN DE TÉRMINOS,
SÍMBOLOS Y CULTURA MILITAR



DIPOE

DIRECCIÓN PRODUCCIÓN, DOCTRINA,
ORGANIZACIÓN Y EQUIPAMIENTO



DESTA

DIRECCIÓN DE ESTÁNDARES
DE PREPARACIÓN



DIGED

DIRECCIÓN DE GESTIÓN, ESTANDARIZACIÓN
Y DIFUSIÓN DE DOCTRINA



DILEA

DIRECCIÓN DE LECCIONES APRENDIDAS



CEDOE

CENTRO DE DOCTRINA
DEL EJÉRCITO

MILITARY DOCTRINE :

GUARDIAN OF THE ELECTIONS



Colonel

Carlos Alfredo Castro Pinzón

Director of the Army Doctrine Center

Professional in Military Sciences at the “General José María Córdova” Military School, specialist in University Teaching at the Cavalry School (ESCAB) and specialist in Security and National Defense at the Superior War School.

During his military career, he has served as an armored platoon commander in the Mechanized Cavalry Group No. 02 “Coronel Juan José Rondón”; armored squadron commander in the Mechanized Cavalry Group No. 04 “Juan del Corral”; Cavalry School’s studies inspector; deputy director of the Cavalry School; commander of the 3rd Mechanized Cavalry Group “José María Cabal”; full military professor (in the subjects of Geopolitics, Defense and Border Security), vice-rector and dean of the Faculty of Military Sciences and International Relations of the Military School and deputy director of the same faculty; and commander of the Medium Combined Arms Task Force No. 01 at the Buenavista Military Fort, La Guajira.

Together with the fulfillment of the entrusted task —“the defense of sovereignty, independence, the integrity of the national territory and the constitutional order” (Colombian Congress, 1991, art. 217)—, the current scenario demands a Continuous evolution of the tactics, techniques and procedures of the National Army in favor of the modernization and adaptation of its capabilities to offer a timely, forceful, effective and sustainable response to the strategic requirements in the combat field.

Additionally, the strategic context and the approach of the Government as a whole —which “integrates the collaborative efforts of the ministries, entities and organizations of the Colombian State, in order to achieve unity of effort towards a common goal” (Colombian National Army, 2017a [1-18])—, the Force also has the crucial task of conducting military operations jointly and in interagency coordination (Colombian National Army, 2017d [1-31]) throughout the national territory to create the conditions that allow the civilian population to perceive a safe and protected environment during the electoral elections scheduled for 2022.


In this sense, its fundamental role is to support governance and institutionality, as part of the stability tasks, which

They cover military missions, tasks and activities carried out inside or outside the national territory, in coordination with other instruments of national power, looking to maintain or restore a safe environment, the provision of essential government services, the reconstruction of emergency infrastructure and humanitarian assistance (Colombian National Army, 2017b [3-9]).

In addition, to contribute to the deployment of wide-area security (Colombian National Army, 2017b [3-14]), as part of its distinctive competencies; that is, of those “essential and enduring capabilities of this, which define its fundamental contributions to the security of the nation” (Colombian National Army, 2017c [4-6]).

Without a doubt, this important moment for Colombian democracy requires a total commitment from the Force and a military doctrine that supports its actions. For this reason, this body of knowledge was reviewed, prioritized and updated —in an organized, professional, systematic and projected manner— and an attempt was made to standardize it in doctrinal manuals produced in four phases: fundamental Army manuals (MFE), Basic Army Reference Manuals (MFRE), Army Field Manuals (MCE), and Army Techniques Manuals (MTE) (Colombian National Army, 2017c [2-19]) —the last two phases are still in the process of generation-.

Precisely, the guidance of the higher command and the work of officers and non-commissioned officers (active and reserve), education and training schools, validators and experts in the military sciences - together with the concepts emerging from the experience of years, the



This important moment for Colombian democracy requires a total commitment from the Force and a military doctrine that supports its actions.

lessons learned, the study of operational concepts and the evolution of military sciences in the context of the nation's security and defense—have allowed this transversal advance for the mission of the institution.

In accordance with the latter, to facilitate and to protect the presidential and legislative elections, and by virtue of the application of the operational concept of the Army's: unified ground operations (OTU) (Colombian National Army, 2017d [4-1]) — which is stipulated in military doctrine—allows the Force to conduct joint military operations and in interagency coordination through decisive action—understood as the “continuous and simultaneous combination of offensive, defensive, stability or defense support tasks to civil authority”—and guided by mission-type command (Colombian National Army, 2017e [1-10]).

At this point, it is important to define mission command as a command philosophy and as a warfighting function. The first refers to the “exercise of authority

and direction through the application of six principles that balance the art of command and the science of control to empower agile and adaptable leaders who exploit the initiative” (2017e [1-10]). The second can be understood as

the set of interrelated tasks and systems that allows the commander to integrate, synchronize and articulate the elements of combat power into a coherent whole, to concentrate their effects at the decisive moment and place (Colombian National Army, 2017b [8-5]).

From this perspective, the institution has the tools and capabilities to meet the current needs of 2022 and face the challenges of future undefined and changing threats. For this, it must analyze the operational environment (Colombian National Army, 2017c [4-21]), the operational variables —defined as the “broad set of information categories used to describe an operational environment. The categories are political, economic, military, social, information, time, infrastructure and physical environment (PEMSITIM)”





To facilitate and to protect the presidential and legislative elections, and by virtue of the application of the operational concept of the Army's: unified ground operations (OTU) (Colombian National Army, 2017d [4-1]) – which is stipulated in military doctrine—allows the Force to conduct joint military operations and in interagency coordination through decisive action.

(2017c [4-24]) — and the mission variables —conceived as “the categories of specific information necessary to execute the operations. These are known as METT-TC: Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Available Troops and Support, Available Time and Civil Considerations” (2017c [4-26]) —.

Finally, the principle of harmonic cooperation and collaboration —established through constitutional and jurisprudence (Colombian Congress, 1991, art. 113; Colombian Constitutional Court, 2004, Judgment C-246/04)— empowers the National Army to give compliance with what is ordered by the national government and contribute to the unified action to allow the free exercise of the right to vote (Colombian Congress, 1991, art. 258) within the national territory.

Thus, today more than ever, the constitutional mission demands that the National Army be professional and efficient, with a doctrine that respects national and international laws, that protects Human Rights and that is adapted to the needs of the country with knowledge, expertise, determination, professionalism and esprit de corps, with the intention of consolidating the military profession through leadership, combative morale and operational forcefulness.

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MILITARY EDUCATION CENTER: MAINSTREAMING KNOWLEDGE



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During his military career, he has served as director of the Department of Doctrine Production, Organization and Equipment of the Army Doctrine Center, Director of Army organization, chief of staff of the Army Aviation Division and commander of the 25th Army Aviation Brigade.

In 2022, the country is going to assume one of the biggest challenges that democratic nations have: legislative and executive elections. Particularly, Colombia will do so in a complex operational environment (National Army of Colombia, 2017a [4-21]); an environment in which different threats try to destabilize the State and delegitimize the Government and its institutions through all forms of struggle.

For this reason, the Armed Forces -especially the National Army- will follow the guidelines issued by the higher command and deploy security measures during the elections of community action boards, municipal and local youth, presidential and legislative councils; consequently, they will concentrate all the capacity (National Army of Colombia, 2017a [1-6]) focused on guaranteeing the effective conduct of popular elections and the right of the Colombian people to freely exercise their vote.

However, military capabilities must respond in an effective, achievable, professional and interoperable manner to the requirements of the national order; therefore, doctrine will behave as a key conditioning element for the organization, material, personnel, facilities, leadership and education, training and maintenance (DOMPILEM) - "aspects that must be observed in planning by capabilities, both in material and non-material solutions, in the face of the force's requirements to meet present and future challenges" (National Army of Colombia, 2017a [1-7])- , and will intervene transversally so that it can integrate a structured vision of factors whose articulation generates an advantage over the threat.

Thus, within the organization, the National Army contemplates the design of the Force (National Army of Colombia, 2017a [1-8]); that is, the functions, structure and protocol that give rise to the general staff and the chiefs of staff (Plans and Policies, Force Generator and Operations). In terms of material, it analyzes the elements necessary to equip the units and maintain their effective operation. Personnel is understood as one of the components of the warfare conduct function "Sustainment" and focuses on the human resources needed to fight in war, face contingencies or participate in peace operations (National Army of Colombia, 2017a [1-8]), in addition to addressing issues related to welfare, transfers, incorporation and retirements, health and promotions.

Facilities cover real estate (National Army of Colombia, 2017a [1-8]) and everything related to it, training areas and services. The leadership and education aspect focuses on how to "prepare Commanders at each step to conduct combat through professional development" (National Army of Colombia, 2017a [1-8]). Training deals with "what combat readiness should look like from basic training to individual specialist training at the different steps" (National Army of Colombia, 2017a [1-8]); i.e., coaching, training, formal and non-formal education. Finally, maintenance includes all activities that guarantee the sustainment of the capability over time.



Military capabilities must respond in an effective, achievable, professional and interoperable manner to the requirements of the national order; therefore, doctrine will behave as a key conditioning element for the organization, material, personnel, facilities, leadership and education, training and maintenance (DOMPILEM).

¹ This acronym is also used in NATO with an additional 'I' at the end to indicate interoperability, or with a 'P' to include those a 'P' to include those governmental or institutional policies that affect capability.

All of the above - together with the study, understanding and adaptation of lessons learned - reaffirms the identity, flexibility and capacity of the Force to transform itself in the face of current challenges and new scenarios. In the same sense, the evaluation of capabilities allows it to identify shortcomings in order to correct them and improve operational forcefulness; in this regard, it is essential to highlight that the National Army has been tested during several decades of conflict in which it has had to face a countless number of threats -and their combinations-, and has become a reference for many countries in the region and for multinational organizations -such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-.

Additionally, it is essential to understand the dynamic evolution of the operational environment (National Army of Colombia, 2017a [4-21]) and the way in which these capability components must adapt to the dilemmas generated by different threats. The first of these - doctrine - is presented as an essential tool to analyze the problems that the Force is going to face and, consequently, to be able to generate strategies - embodied in plans and orders of operations - aimed at articulating the highest interests of the nation.

In this way, development of "synchronization, coordination and/or integration of activities of governmental and non-governmental entities with military operations" (National Army of Colombia, 2017c [2-10]) and achieving unity of effort- "coordination and cooperation towards common objectives, even when the participants do not necessarily belong to the same command or organization" can be achieved (National Army of Colombia, 2017b [3-23]).

Under this understanding, military doctrine is the capability component that contains a series of tools available to commanders at all levels and that contributes to the articulation of the eight elements of combat power -leadership, information, mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment and protection (National Army of Colombia, 2017c [6-2])- , with the purpose of conducting effective military operations.



El aspecto del liderazgo y la educación se enfoca en la forma de “preparar a los comandantes en cada uno de los escalones para conducir el combate a través del desarrollo profesional”.

Due to the above, in its transformation and modernization process, the Colombian National Army has been reviewing, hierarchizing and updating its doctrine to be able to adapt to the constant changes, ambiguity and complexity of the operational environment.

Alignment with the Military Education Center

The mission of the Army Military Education Center (CEMIL) is to comprehensively

educate and train members of the National Army and other communities interested in the academic programs offered by this institution, through the development of the competencies of being, knowing, doing and coexisting inherent to military science and other disciplines complementary to this profession in order to ensure the optimal performance of men and women serving the defense sector and other sectors of the community in general, to maintain an environment of security and defense in the Colombian community, supporting the development of the country and guaranteeing the constitutional order (CEMIL, 2022).

According to this premise, it not only has the task of disseminating military doctrine, but also of aligning its curriculum with it; therefore, in 321 military courses of the academic offer, the content of the doctrinal manuals has been included, which are being generated in four phases: the fundamental Army manuals (MFE), the fundamental Army reference manuals (MFRE), the Army campaign manuals (MCE) and the Army techniques manuals (MTE).

As part of the process of assimilation of this military doctrine is the full understanding of fundamental concepts, such as 'unified land operations (OTU)', which refers to those

offensive, defensive, stability or defense support tasks executed simultaneously to capture, retain and exploit initiative and consolidate gains to prevent conflict, configure the operational environment and win in war as part of unified action (National Army of Colombia, 2017b [4-1]).

The doctrine is presented as an essential tool to analyze the problems that the Force is going to face and, consequently, to be able to generate strategies - embodied in plans and orders of operations - aimed at articulating the highest interests of the nation.

And 'unified action', which is the "synchronization, coordination and/or integration of activities of governmental and non-governmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort" (National Army of Colombia, 2017c [2-10]). As such, this is conceived as an 'umbrella' term for the conduct of OTUs, which are executed through decisive action—"continuous and simultaneous combination of offensive, defensive, stability or defense support tasks to civil authority" -(National Army of Colombia, 2017b [4-25]).


In turn, the above requires the employment of the Army's distinctive competencies: combined arms maneuver (MAC), wide area security (SAE) and special operations (SO) - "essential and enduring Army capabilities that define its fundamental contributions to the nation's security" (National Army of Colombia, 2017a [4-6])-. All this set allows the Force to fulfill its strategic roles of preventing conflict, shaping the operational environment and winning the war.

In synthesis, what is expected is that commanders in the different steps understand and apply multiple doctrinal constructs and concepts to achieve the objectives set out within the strategy at the three levels of war (National Army of Colombia, 2017a [4-51]) correlated, of course, with the specific levels of responsibility.

As part of the superior education process, the Army has been reinforcing training with the intention of being able to transversalize the 2022 campaign at all levels: "leadership, combative morale and operational forcefulness". The first will always be presented as the greatest intangible enhancer to lead the military profession and serve the nation with honor; the second will allow to fulfill the purpose of reviving the



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original military sense of esprit de corps; and the third will be the result of the fulfillment of the soldier's noblest duty: to watch over the homeland.


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As part of the superior education process, the Army has been reinforcing training with the intention of being able to transversalize the 2022 campaign at all levels: "leadership, combative morale and operational forcefulness".

DIME AND PEMSITIM: TWO FRAMEWORKS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT



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Once again, in 2022, the democratic system in Colombia will be on the test: a social state of law, with the autonomy of powers, freedom of the press, and political participation; that has been always supported by its security and defense institutions. Precisely, this article aims for decision-makers to choose a framework that allows them to do their analysis and develop an understanding of current and future scenarios, in the face of the electoral processes of the legislative and executive powers.

Politicians and military commanders seek to make the best decisions in their areas of responsibility, they play roles in environments of uncertainty typical of global dynamics that evolve side by side with multiple factors, such as technology and globalization. In fact, amid these scenarios, they employ various methodologies that provide them with an understanding of the essential context for planning and executing tasks during their political work or the conduct of military operations, respectively.

Starting from the need to establish frameworks that help understand the operational environment and the global context, it is essential to explore the fact that it is feasible to find different concepts that facilitate addressing these at the levels of war (strategic, operational, and tactical environments). (Colombian National Army, 2017a [4-51]).

There is a strategic environment in which political leaders, military commanders, and strategic intelligence recognize and assess the capabilities, activities, and intentions of state and non-state actors, to identify risks and opportunities for the citizen's security interests. As proposed by the National Intelligence Strategy of the United States (Director of National Intelligence, 2019).

In this strategic environment, intelligence understands and anticipates any type of threat to a State, regardless of its nature, and understands the strategic environment, which is defined in the doctrine as "a variety of national, international and global factors that affect the decisions of political leaders regarding the use of the instruments of national power in times of peace and periods of conflict" (Colombian Military Forces General Command, 2018).

From a military perspective, the threats are transregional, multidomain, and multifunctional (TMM), which, when incorporated into traditional conflicts, represent significant and evolving challenges. These include irregular threats, terrorism and information operations (IO) targeted directly at the political leadership and the civilian population, which to a certain extent, affect the capacity of a nation and limit the projection of its interests, that is, the definition that Franck Hoffman described as hybrid threats.



Politicians and military commanders seek to make the best decisions in their areas of responsibility, they play roles in environments of uncertainty typical of global dynamics that evolve side by side with multiple factors, such as technology and globalization.

Now, understanding this strategic environment implies having to assimilate a variety of information, such as knowledge of politics, diplomacy, the economy, security developments, and other issues that impact the construction of the future for nations.

In this same context, the military doctrine defines the operational environment as a "composition of conditions, circumstances and influences that affect the use of capabilities and weigh on the commander's decisions" (Colombian National Army, 2017a [4-21]).

Having understood their particular environment, Army leaders plan, prepare, execute and evaluate military operations through analysis, in terms of operational variables and those of the mission, since their study provides the information necessary for each commander to frame the problem in your area of operations or area of responsibility. Next, you can visualize the desired end state (Colombian National Army, 2017b [1-49]), set the operational focus (2017b [3-11]), and direct the forces (Colombian National

Army, 2017c [3-4]).) and the functions of conducting the war (Colombian National Army, 2017d [7-19]) according to what was determined in the operations process (Colombian National Army, 2017e [1-1]).

Based on the above, it is intended to take a look at two models used to analyze and understand the strategic environment and the operational environment. In the first place, the DIME (diplomacy, information, military, and economy), which incorporates the concept of international relations proposed by Joseph Nye in the second half of the 20th century, serves to represent the actions that a State takes to influence the strategic environment. Secondly, the PEMSITIM (Political, economic, military, social, information, time, infrastructure, and physical environment), simplifies the operational variables with which the current state of the situation of a geographic area or a region is represented, to frame the operational environment.






Figure 1. Evaluation frameworks

Source: Autor Elaboration

Operational variables (PEMSITIM)

One of the concepts incorporated in the process of reviewing, prioritizing and updating the doctrine of the Colombian National Army is that of operational variables, understood as “a broad set of information categories used to describe an operational environment [...] The categories they are political, economic, military, social, information, time, infrastructure and physical environment (PEMSITIM)” (Colombian National Army, 2017a [4-24]).

These constitute an essential tool for leaders, commanders, members of a state or staff, and intelligence analysts within the planning, preparation, execution and evaluation of operations (Colombian National Army, 2017e [1-1]), because they guide them towards the development of plans and orders, through the application of art and operational design, based on the use of one of the Army’s planning methodologies: the Army’s design methodology (Colombian National Army, 2017e [3-7]), the military decision-making process (2017e [3-11]) or the command procedure (2017e [3-14]). This allows them to combine art and science to generate products that describe how (form) they will use their capabilities (means) to achieve the desired end state (ends).

However, the fundamental manual of the Army 3-0, Operations, establishes that to understand an operational environment, a holistic vision is required on the part of the commanders, the planning team, and the intelligence analysts, which covers the physical areas, the multiple factors from the domains (air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace), the information environment (including cyberspace), and the areas of interest necessary to conduct operations. In addition, various aspects must be considered, such as terrain, topography, hydrology, hydrography, meteorology, oceanography, space, surface, subsurface environmental conditions (natural or artificial), distances associated with deployment and the use of units and their capabilities, among others.

Namely, another inherent component of the operational environment is the information environment, defined as the “set of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate or act on information” (Colombian National Army, 2017b [6-19]). It is composed of three interrelated dimensions: physical, informational, and cognitive, within which individuals, organizations, and systems continuously interact with each other. As an important element, there in cyberspace, which is superimposed on the

physical and informational dimensions within the information environment.


In particular, the operational variables were developed by the joint military community of the United States within the military operational design, as an approach to assess the operational environment through the analysis of systems with a dual purpose (Ducote, 2010). The first evaluates the systems and capabilities of an adversary in a conventional conflict to achieve victory; the second uses a tool to evaluate the related systems in the construction of a nation and achieve success, that is, it uses a global methodology to understand the operational environment from a holistic perspective.

So the operational variables are established as a systematic analysis tool to identify their relationships, both potential and existing, and understand the holistic nature as all the properties of a system that cannot be explained or understood separately, but as a determining set of the behavior of all its parts.

As seen in the figure, the analysis of the operational environment also contributes to identifying the centers of gravity of an adversary or enemy and their capabilities, needs, and critical vulnerabilities, which implies knowing their strengths, their physical and psychological weaknesses, their organization, his way of fighting and his decision making. Identifying their nodes and links helps commanders assess each system's significant proprietary capabilities and vulnerabilities, centers of gravity, their relationship to adversaries or enemies, and the approach to influencing or changing their behaviors and determining effective options to neutralize them. (overcome) through decisive action (AD).

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Now, taking into account different national and international scenarios (which contemplate phenomena such as demographic growth, urbanization, globalization, the influence of information technologies, pandemics, the demand for resources, climate change, etc.), it is clear that they influence the environments in which the Army can conduct operations. Therefore, analyzing them through the use of systems and tools provides a more complete understanding of the significant relationships and interdependencies (the relationships between and within operational variables in an operational environment).

The Instruments of Power (DIME)

To understand the instruments of power, concepts and decisions of power must be approached in terms of international relations. Thus, Morgenthau (2005) defines power as "man's control over the minds and actions of other men" and adds that "political power consists of a relationship between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised". In other terms, he tries to reflect a vision of power both in relational terms and in terms of the possession of resources; therefore, power, in the context of international relations, can be understood as "the ability to influence the behavior of others to meet objectives or achieve the desired result" through the use of available resources.

Perhaps the first one that try to explain the existence of instruments of power was Edward Carr, in 1939, when he affirmed that political power in the international sphere could be divided, for purposes of discussion, into three categories: military power, economic power, and power over the opinions (it made clear that power was an indivisible whole and that one instrument could not exist for long in the absence of the others).

However, Carr's formulation was supplanted. During the Cold War, DIME was used as a common acronym for the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power. In the case of the United States, in the 1960s, these instruments rested in institutions of the American government, such as the Department of State (diplomatic), the United States Information Agency (information), the Department of Defense (military), and the United States Agency for International Development (economic), respectively.

However, from Carr's point of view, diplomacy was not an instrument of power, but the art of applying the instruments of power (rather than a separate instrument in itself). From this perspective, a diplomat can be seen negotiating with friends, enemies, and neutrals, always backed by the potential application of military power, economic power, and power over one state's opinion of others.

From the perspective of realism, authors such as Joseph Nye make a distinction between hard power and soft power. This hard power implies the ability to use, in Nye's words, "carrots and sticks," which is nothing more than military and economic power to influence other international actors. The "carrots" are equivalent to incentives, such as the reduction of trade barriers, the offer of alliances, or the promise of military protection; the "sticks" represent threats, such as the use of coercive diplomacy, the threat of military intervention, or the implementation of economic sanctions.

In the same vein, soft power appears, which is much closer to Carr's power over opinion, than the DIME information instrument.

This soft power includes influence through the media. According to Nye (1991), the main sources of soft power are the values of the actors who use this power, their culture, policies, and institutions. To a certain extent, these main sources are capable of attracting or repelling other actors to make them "want what you want".

However, this author also stated that "the ability to combine hard and soft power" can generate smart power. In other words, the most cunning and appropriate way to use power instruments, diplomacy, information, military and economy, generates certain advantages of some nations to be able to influence others without always having to use coercive means.

According to The Lightning Press (2017), national power is defined as the sum of all available resources of a nation in pursuit of national goals. According to this agency, national power arises from various elements, also called instruments or attributes, which can be divided into two groups according to their applicability and origin: "national" and "social".

The first includes geography, resources, and population; the second, the economy, politics and military, psychological and informational power. In other words, instruments of national power emphasize the tools a country uses to influence other countries or international organizations (including non-state actors, as shown in the table below).

D (Diplomatic)	I (Informational)	M (Military)	E (Economic)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Embassies, Ambassadors • Recognition • Negotiations • Treaties • Policies • International forums 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Military information • Public diplomacy • Public affairs • Communications resources • International forums • Spokespersons, timing, media and venues for announcements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Military Operations • Engagement, Security Coop, Deterrence • Show of Force • Military technology • Size, composition of force 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trade policies • Fiscal and monetary policies • Embargoes • Tariffs • Taxes • Assistance

Table 1. The Instruments of National Power
 Source: The Lightning Press (2017)

For the United States, the National Security Strategy (NSS) is mandated by Congress and is the main document that sets out how the president plans to use the instruments of power to achieve national security goals.

In the words of Farlin (2014), the power of a nation to impose its will and achieve its national goals emanates from its instruments of national power (which include diplomacy, information, military, and economy power—collectively identified by the acronym DIME—and how they have been used by different international actors. Therefore, for strategic intelligence, it is imperative to know and manage them to be able to develop analysis products to present to decision-makers (political and military).

Integration of The Instruments of National Power and The Operational Variables

Now, it must be understood that a State or a government has some instruments of power (DIME) through which it seeks to obtain effects, either to change the current situation of a region or an area within the country (which is evaluated through operational variables [PEMSITIM]) or to influence other actors in the international system; however, the good administration and timing of the former is what produces the desired results of a ruler in a scenario.

For example, in the internal case of a country, its administration based on the proper use of its institutions (DIME) can materialize results that allow it to generate better conditions of stability and governance; that is,

The power of a nation to impose its will and achieve its national goals emanates from its instruments of national power (which include diplomacy, information, military, and economy power—collectively identified by the acronym DIME—).



a border region with another country where security conditions are not as desired (due to the constant presence of armed non-state actors, who carry out multiple activities against the population and take advantage of the border area as a rearguard to elude the authorities), demands good diplomatic relations between countries, to conduct multinational military

operations and reduce or neutralize the capabilities of the threat. In this way, if necessary, better governance conditions could be produced that lead to the improved economic development of the countries, through the use of other instruments of power, as evidenced in the following figure.




Figure 2. Framework PEMSITIM and DIME
Source: Abbott (2015)

Conclusions

Military doctrine offers the acronyms DIME and PEMSITIM that help to understand the essential general context for effective decision-making during the planning and execution of tasks, both in the political framework and in the conduct of military operations.

There are instruments of power that a nation has that are integrated into diplomacy, information, the military, and the economy (DIME) and through which it contributes to materializing its national objectives and preserving its interests, both in the vital space and in the international system.

During the operational design, the operational variables (political, economic, military, social, information, time, infrastructure, and physical environment [PEMSITIM]) help to understand the current state of an area of operations or a region and allow to identify which could be the operational approach to achieving the desired end state. With this understood, governments can use their DIME influence elements to mold, configure or adapt the circumstances of a region or an area (operational environment), which is evaluated using operational variables to comply with their public policies and generate desired governance conditions.

Military doctrine offers the acronyms DIME and PEMSITIM that help to understand the essential general context for effective decision-making during the planning and execution of tasks, both in the political framework and in the conduct of military operations.

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CONCEPTUAL PLANNING

AS A COGNITIVE MEANS TO DETERMINE THE CHALLENGES OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

(CONDUCT OF PLAN DEMOCRACY)



Colonel (R)

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During his military career, he served as advisor to the Inter-American Defense College, Operations Officer of the Sixth and Eighth Brigades, Commander of the Jungle Battalion No. 50 and Jaime Rooke, Chief of Staff of the Eighth Brigade, Commander of the Mobile Brigade No. 22. In addition, he was coordinator of the Integral Security and Risk Analysis Diploma, and teacher of the modules of Physical Security, Industrial and Occupational Security; Document and Information Security; and Technological and Electronic Security, at the Andean Area University.

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The Defense and Security Policy for Legality, Entrepreneurship and Equity of the current Government describes the threats in the national context, according to the National Security Council, as organized armed groups (GAO), the National Liberation Army (ELN), the Gulf Clan, the Pelusos, the Puntilleros and the residual GAO; in addition, it determines the existence of 23 organized crime groups (GDO), whose criminal activity has regional scope, and 2417 gangs affecting cities and municipalities (Presidency of the Republic, Ministry of National Defense, 2018, p. 23).

Today, most of the GAOs, GDOs and criminal gangs have had a growth in strength and have generated greater factors of instability. Faced with this national situation, the State has difficult challenges to guarantee the fundamental rights of those who stand as candidates in electoral elections to be part of collegiate bodies and of citizens who are going to exercise their right, due to the existence of an operational environment-"composition of conditions, circumstances and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and weigh on the commander's decisions" (National Army of Colombia, 2017a [4-21])-that is dynamic and changing because of the negative affectation of its conditions by threats.

The operations process (PRODOP)-"series of steps that the commander develops in operations through mission-type command: plan, prepare, execute, and evaluate" (Colombian Army, 2017b [1-1])-provides the commander and the state or staff with a comprehensive process for conducting and describing operations. Consequently, a complex operational environment, such as the one described above, demands that the four steps of the process be fulfilled at all echelons of the organization: Army, division, brigade, battalion, company, platoon, and squad.

This article aims to provide the reader with a series of elements extracted from the first step of PRODOP: planning, which is defined as the "art and science of understanding a situation prospectively in order to visualize the desired future and outline effective ways to achieve it" (Colombian Army, 2017b [3-1]).

Specifically, the development of the four steps of the operations process requires the commander and his staff to understand the unique operational environment in which their subordinate units conduct military operations.

The commander and staff have an important role in the PRODOP. On the one hand, the commander's role is to drive it through six activities: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead and evaluate operations. On the other hand, the staff's role is to assist the commander in



The operations process (PRODOP)-"series of steps that the commander develops in operations through mission-type command: plan, prepare, execute, and evaluate" -provides the commander and the state or staff with a comprehensive process for conducting and describing operations.

understanding the situation, making and implementing decisions, controlling operations and evaluating progress. In addition, it advises subordinate units (commanders and staffs) and keeps units and organizations outside the command informed about the development of operations. (Colombian Army, 2017b [1-3]).

Military doctrine allows the use of cognitive tools that facilitate the art of war and quantitative tools based on tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) to be used by a commander and his staff in a specific situation according to his level of planning, operational environment and mission.

Now, during military operations, Army units face multifaceted enemies with clear objectives and with the willingness to quickly assimilate what happens in the conditions of the operational environment in which they act, which allows them to react quickly to various circumstances through the use of emerging capabilities, which cannot be defined or understood from simple doctrinal structures.

In short, this is what military units may be confronted with during the conduct and execution of the tasks and missions established in the Democracy Plan, which consists of deploying security devices and guaranteeing the electoral process during the elections to be held in Colombia in 2022 (Ministry of National Defense, 2022).

Therefore, it is essential to understand that the operational environment is not static, but changing and that it has a great capacity for rotation and evolution, which for the dynamic nature of the conflict makes it difficult to determine the cause and effect relationships of the instability factors, contributes to increase uncertainty and friction and hinders the proper execution of military operations.

In short, the regenerative capabilities of the threat demand greater and constant innovation in terms of the design of military operations; that is, they make it necessary for commanders and staffs to apply operational art (Colombian Army, 2017a [4-43]; Colombian Army, 2017c, [3-7]) from conceptual planning.

For this reason, military doctrine required to evolve towards integrated planning, which consists of two components interdependent and closely related: conceptual and detailed. Conceptual planning corresponds to the operational art and the commander's approach advised by his staff, for which he employs the Army Design Methodology (MDE) -defined as "a system to apply critical and creative thinking, in order to understand, visualize and describe complex problems and establish approaches for their solution" (Colombian Army, 2017b [3-7])- (Colombian Army, 2017b [3-7]).



The MDE allows the commander and his staff to understand the operational environment to frame it, visualize the end state, determine the obstacles (problems) that do not allow reaching the end state, structure solutions to solve the problems and thus achieve the desired conditions; in turn, all this leads them to be able to establish objectives and sequence the operation to produce effects in the operational environment. Additionally, there are two activities of the commander that are fundamental during this type of planning: understanding and visualizing -because they force to think and analyze what is happening before acting-.

The other component is detailed planning, which is developed through the military process for decision making (PMTD) -defined as "a cyclical planning methodology to understand the situation and the mission, develop courses of action, select the most opportune one and produce a plan or order of operations" ((Colombian Army, 2017b [3-11])-). This is performed following well-ordered steps and executed in an objective, rational and logical manner. Moreover, it is a proven planning process widely accepted by the military organization, with the purpose of allowing solving problems and ensuring that the right ones are solved.

Namely, the nation conducts a democratic exercise every four years: the conduct of elections to choose representatives of the popularly elected collegiate bodies for the senate and the house of representatives. At first glance, in terms of organization and functions, this might seem repetitive and easy to perform, due to the amount of information that is available and has been stored with each electoral exercise.

However, as far as the Public Force is concerned, it is more than a repetition exercise, it is a mechanism to understand the dynamics of the same, to extract the lessons learned and to understand the structural changes, the advance of technology and social values, in order to avoid replicating elements elaborated or designed for previous electoral circumstances -situation that results in the ignorance of the current operational environment of the assigned area of operations-.

It is essential to understand that the operational environment is not static, but changing and that it has a great capacity for rotation and evolution, which for the dynamic nature of the conflict makes it difficult to determine the cause and effect relationships of the instability factors, contributes to increase uncertainty and friction and hinders the proper execution of military operations.

In that understanding, the operational environment, unique and proper, is different from the one that a unit could have had in the previous electoral exercise, since precisely one of its own characteristics is the dynamic, changing and complex nature in which the various manifestations of crime and violence take place (Presidency of the Republic, Ministry of National Defense, 2018, p. 24) that affect the fundamental rights of both local and regional leaders and ordinary citizens -without leaving aside, of course, the direct or indirect affectation on political parties, NGOs, media, economic guilds, community leaders, indigenous leaders, leaders of different churches, governors, mayors, councilors, unions and young people, among others-. Undoubtedly, this makes the operational environment increasingly complex.

All the aforementioned aspects require the understanding of the operational environment from a systemic perspective, which allows the commander and his staff to distinguish the relationship between multiple actors and relevant variables of the operational

environment - operational variables grouped in the acronym PEMSITIM - in order to understand, visualize and describe it.

This is how planning -conceptual- requires the operational environment to be framed based on the current state -what is happening-, from the understanding of the current conditions in order to visualize the desired final state. How should the operational environment be seen? Through desired conditions. The obstacles that prevent progress towards the desired end state allow the commander and his staff to frame the operational problem - defined as the "discrepancy between the current state of affairs and the state it should be in, which requires the use of military actions for its solution" (Colombian Army, 2019).

Once the obstacles preventing progress towards the desired end state have been identified, it is required to design the actions that will solve the problem; that is, to develop an operational approach - "description of the general actions that the force must execute to transform the current conditions into those desired in the end state" (Colombian Army, 2017b [2-12])- (Colombian Army, 2017b [2-12]). Then, it is also important to understand that the commander's visualization starts "as a mental process of developing an understanding of the situation, determining a desired end state and visualizing an operational approach by which the force will achieve that end state" (National Army of Colombia, 2017b [2-7]).



Now, the Army's operational concept - unified land operations (OTU) - recognizes the importance of unified action based on the "synchronization, coordination and/or integration of activities of governmental and non-governmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort" (Colombian Army, 2017d [2-10]). Precisely, the Defense and Security Policy for Legality, Entrepreneurship, and Equity contains this guideline with the purpose of

seek unity of effort among state entities, the private sector, civil society organizations, international cooperation, the Armed Forces and the National Police, in order to comprehensively overcome the absence of the State, the deficit of its presence in the territories, as well as the factors that generate stability (Presidency of the Republic, Ministry of National Defense, 2018, p. 62).

In summary, within the planning, the objectives outlined in the Defense and Security Policy for Legality, Entrepreneurship and Equity; in the Agora II Plan; and in the Democracy Plan should be taken into account as a source of consultation. These documents have been designed to guarantee the security of the elections and the protection measures for candidates through the National Protection Unit (UNP) and the National Police.



Photo: National Army photo archive.

These guidelines allow - in the concept of operation within the order of operations - to describe the way in which the units will support the mission of the higher command and the way in which the actions of the subordinate units will be intertwined in compliance with the decisive action, through lines of operations for the conduct and execution of offensive and defensive tasks and lines of effort to develop stability tasks (Colombian Army, 2017e [2-17]) and/or defense support to civil authority (ADAC) (Colombian Army, 2017f, ch 4), with the intention of articulating them using the logic of purpose, rather than geographic reference.

Military operations are conducted to solve operational problems that exist in an operational environment; hence, the operational environment cannot be detached from the assigned area of operations and, consequently, the need to understand it in order to assess whether the tasks and objectives planned and achieved by the units allow for changes in the desired conditions to achieve the desired end state.

The Colombian National Army has the Army Techniques Manual (MTE) 5-0. 1, Army Design Methodology: Art and Operational Design, a doctrinal tool that facilitates the commander and his staff the development of conceptual planning to clearly define the problem, based on the understanding of the operational environment, and carry out detailed planning through the military process for decision making (PMTD) (Colombian Army, 2017b [3-11]), with the purpose of solving the right problem and not focusing on the one that, subjectively, is to be solved.

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ARE THE MILITARY FORCES THE SUPPORT OF DEMOCRACY?

“The worst of democracies is a thousand times preferable to the best of dictatorships”

Ruy Barbosa



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*Throughout history,
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Throughout history, the military institution has always played a fundamental role in the formation and stability of States and their political systems. When it comes to democracy, its role is the subject of heated debate; for some, his contribution is undeniable; for others, their participation is difficult to define.

Therefore, this text intends to contribute to this analysis through a question: are the Military Forces the support of democracy? To do this, it will resort to some examples of autocracies that made transitions to democracies and had the active participation of their Armed Forces. Then, it will establish the characteristics of an army in a democratic system and the six elements that democratic leader must consider regarding the constitution of their Military Forces. Finally, it will present the conclusions regarding the detailed.

In Colombia, in 2022, two extremely important events for the democratic exercise of the nation will take place: the legislative or parliamentary elections (in March) and the election of the executive (in May) (El Nuevo Siglo, 2022). To guarantee the free and safe development of these democratic fairs, the government will synchronize the efforts of multiple State entities and different ministries; particularly, the Ministry of National Defense will carry out a transcendental task. In this sense, it will issue orders and instructions to the security and defense forces of the State (the National Army, the National Navy, the Colombian Air Force and the National Police), through the Democracy Plan (Sector Communication, Ministry of National Defense, 2022), in order to assign specific roles and tasks to each of their capacities in the national territory.

The foregoing could shed some light on the question posed; however, it is necessary to review the different edges of his answer. First, there are the examples of the previous decade, in which some dictatorships came to an end peacefully, but with strong military support. In Tunisia, the Army and the Military Forces refused to raise their weapons to repress the people and made sure to maintain the tranquility of the inhabitants by providing security after the uncertainty generated by the abrupt change of power (Muñoz, 2011). In Egypt, after 18 days of protests and riots in the main cities of the country, in the month of January 2011, the Army supported its people until President Mubarak abandoned his dictatorship; as such, the Armed Forces sought to maintain the stability and security of their citizens (Prados, 2011).

In the previous cases, the Armed Forces of the two nations played a leading role. After having supported these autocratic mechanisms in which they enjoyed privileged positions for years, the leaders of the armies of Egypt and Tunisia distanced themselves from the same dictators who appointed them as generals years ago. Now, the outcome of the events in these countries is not defined; however, it is clear that, in some autocratic

countries, military leaders are not blind followers of the dictators who appointed them and, therefore, at any time, they can express their disagreement with the mechanisms or reform themselves in surprising ways.

In Latin America, one can observe the cases in which transitions from military dictatorships to democratic systems were carried out, such as the handover of power by the Argentine Military board in 1983, after seven years and a few months in power, where Argentines celebrated the return of democracy (Ministry of Culture Argentina, 2020). In Chile, on March 11, 1990, the dissolution of the Chilean Military board took place, whom transferred power to the democratically elected authorities (Cañas, 1997). In Brazil, José Sarney assumed the presidency on March 15, 1985; After his election, the military regime ended, almost all civil liberties were restored, and the new constitution was concluded in 1988 (D'Alva, 2004).

In Nigeria, Africa, after a series of military coups in 1999, failed but adequate elections were followed by a decade of relative stability (Campbell, 2019). These are just a few examples of the transitions in different parts of the world.

It has been determined that dictatorships are political regimes in which a single person governs with total power, without submitting to any kind of limitations and with the power to promulgate and modify laws at will; however, its definition is not always so clear. In Latin America, they have been presented in various ways, but all have coincided in the loss of freedom

and the little development of the subjectivity of its citizens (Valencia et al., 2016).

Dictatorships are not reached solely by the power of arms; In fact, there have been cases in which they have ended up being consolidated through popular election, such as Nazi Germany or The Chavista Venezuela, because it is impossible for citizens to predict the conditions in which they will be governed and, in this way, the leaders can use their democratic choice to perpetuate themselves in power.

Democracy cannot be reduced to the election of a ruler by majority vote, since, according to the UNESCO, it can be a changing concept that adjusts to the cultural, social and economic needs of each country (for those whose position makes them privileged). In other words, democracy is that freedom that allows citizens to be aware of their political system and their choices, to know that they belong to a market and that they are consumers, to know their functions in society and to understand the importance of the cohesion of the same, without ignoring its subjectivity in the process (Touraine, 1992). In short, when the rulers omit these characteristics and fundamental rights in their political systems, they can hardly be considered democratic.

In this same sense, the fundamental components of democracy are the responsibility of the government towards an electorate that gives it a mandate or that can vote to remove it, the freedom of that electorate to organize itself in political activity, the protection of the rights of all citizens (including minorities through a system of laws that are fairly and effectively

In Latin America, one can observe the cases in which transitions from military dictatorships to democratic systems were carried out, such as the handover of power by the Argentine Military board in 1983, after seven years and a few months in power, where Argentines celebrated the return of democracy.

enforced by a competent police body and an independent judiciary), a low level of corruption with laws and institutions to contain it (both in government as in business) and a free press.

As for the case of the Military Forces, these are made up of citizens who have their own opinions and established subjectivities; for this reason, they cannot go unnoticed or be misused by the elected political system. In this order of ideas, another characteristic of democracy is the role that these Forces assume (in this regard, it must be taken into account that, in a true democracy, the loyalty of the military apparatus is to the people of its country and not to an individual, party, tribe or ethnic or religious faction).

The military must follow the orders of a freely and fairly elected government that represents the people; therefore, it is not up to them to support political parties or political factions. As such, their primary mission is the defense of their country against internal or external threats. When they are used within the country, it is often to suppress an armed uprising, guarantee constitutional order, reinforce a border, or provide aid after a natural disaster. These actions are carried out for a certain time and in support of national government organizations (under special authorities and strict controls that are established under the provisions of the Constitution or a set of laws approved by a legislature).

In the case of Colombia, the above is carried out through stability tasks:

Those that are conducted inside or outside the national territory, in coordination with other instruments of national power, to maintain or restore a safe environment

and provide essential government services, reconstruction of emergency infrastructure and humanitarian assistance (Colombian National Army, 2017a [4-41]).

And, the support of the defense to the civil authority (ADAC):

Support provided by the Colombian Military Forces and all the institutions that make up the defense sector, in response to requests for assistance from national civil authorities for domestic emergencies of any kind, support for law enforcement and other activities with entities qualified to special situations (National Army of Colombia, 2017b [1-1]).

Based on what was mentioned before, it would be worth trying to answer again if the Armed Forces are the support of democracy. You might say yes, but institutions are required to have six key elements that serve as pillars of democracy for this statement to be correct:

1. Established ethical-moral code.
2. Optimum legal corpus that regulates the actions of the Armed Forces.
3. Military doctrine focused on the vital function of defending democracy as a political system of the State.
4. Structured military education, instruction and training system.
5. Organization and adequate resources.
6. Salary system balanced with the development and risk of work.

If any of these constitutive elements presented an imbalance, it could lead to an imbalance for democracy. For example, without the existence of an ethical-moral code, violations of Human Rights, excesses of force, looting and indiscriminate murders by members of the forces of order would be continuous and uncontrollable, as occurred in conflicts such as those in Rwanda or Somalia (Vega, 2011).

In the same way, even if the best ethical-moral code were in place, without that optimal legal corpus, at the end of a conflict and the initiation of possible trials of the members of the Armed Forces, they could be left in a position in which they would find themselves exposed to receiving severe sanctions, despite the fact that they would have been fulfilling their duty. Such was the case of the Argentine officers who were given the order by the political leader to defend democracy from a subversive threat. Over the years, they were judged without taking into account the political and legal context in which the conflict was waged, as expressed by General Heriberto Justo Auel in the Argentine Federal Oral Criminal Court No. 1, on 24 March 2014.

Military doctrine is also essential. This is constituted as the body of knowledge of military science and must guide the development of military operations at its different levels, establishing the fundamental principles, employment and orderly provision of means, resources and men for compliance of the tasks of military work. In addition, you must have descriptive and prescriptive protocols that guide each soldier and you have to establish a common language for all (from those on the front lines to the oldest and most experienced). An army without doctrine is nothing more than a handful of armed men at the mercy of fate; therefore, without a doubt, the decision-making process of commanders must be based on in-depth knowledge of their standard of rules.

Likewise, an ethical-moral code, a legal corpus and a military doctrine that do not include the effective way of teaching and disseminating them is unfeasible; For this reason, every Military Force must have a robust education and training system that is capable of reviewing the administration and curricula of all schools and training centers, with the purpose of trying to guarantee that the problems are addressed and, if necessary, have the possibility to adapt to change. In this virtue, the education and training processes must be continuous, propaedeutic and adaptable to the use of technological tools to guarantee a correct preparation of the military in order to fulfill its mission.

In addition, it should be mentioned that the organization, material and equipment are essential. The threats that hang over democracies are more innovative, have a better arsenal and, on many occasions, are financed by criminal networks, which in some cases may mean that the military advantage does not go to the legitimate forces of the State. It is





the duty of the political leader of the war and of the body that legislates to maintain Military Forces capable of sustaining democracy and constitutional order (through the approval of budgets), in order to try to maintain a balance between the number of troops, the territory of the nation, the number of inhabitants of the State and possible threats.

The sixth element has to do with the salary of the military. This is fundamental, both financially and emotionally, since combative morale is increased. The rulers must maintain an Armed Forces with high morale, through a system of incentives and a salary level that is consistent with the work and the risk that a military face.

Within the Armed Forces, morale can be understood as the interest that a soldier has in individual, team or unit processes, in the shared beliefs and convictions of soldiers and in the reason for their work; therefore, motivation can be understood as the sum of the influences that weigh on a soldier's actions, the degree of commitment and persistence in carrying out a mission.

Although the elements mentioned above are of great importance, an issue of great impact is the presence of soldiers in the electoral elections. Not only with the intention of guaranteeing the massive participation of all his fellow citizens, but also to pay for it. Currently, there are few countries that do not provide the right to vote for the members of the security and defense bodies of the States, including Paraguay, Honduras, Salvador and Colombia (Peralta, 2020). If the governments consider the participation of soldiers in the electoral exercise, they would have to regulate and comply with protocols that grant rights and prohibitions during the contests. Perhaps, this could contribute to the work of interaction between society and the defense forces and would allow the bonds of trust to continue to be strengthened.

Conclusiones

The role of the Military Forces in the construction of democracies is indisputable; provided that they act within clearly defined ethical, moral and legal parameters and that they stay away from political, religious or ethnic biases.

It is essential for the Armed Forces to have a doctrine and an education and training system that allows them to transcend their soldiers and solidify the democratic principles and values by which they carry out their work.

It is important that the States in which democracy prevails, strengthen and maintain Military Forces with enough capabilities to guarantee the working process of the democratic system.

Finally, it is necessary to work on strengthening civil and military relations, strengthening the ties between the military circle and the rest of society. In the case of Colombia, this strengthening is solidified through the integration of the capabilities of the National Army and the partners of the unified action based on military actions that encompass civil affairs, civil-military cooperation, and public affairs.

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DEACTIVATION OF THE CONFLICT BY THE COLOMBIAN ARMED FORCES (1953-1961)¹

*“In Colombia, land of singular events, the military
make peace and the civilians make war”*

Urdaneta, 7 August de 1877, El Mochuelo, 1



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In order to extend the Commission of Truth (CEV) until June 2022, the Colombian Constitutional Court accepted that the pandemic of COVID-19 prevented the collection of firsthand testimonies in some regions of the country (Constitutional Court, 2021). According to a recent study, in other countries, even with more intense conflicts, such collection took just 18-24 months.

These countries did not have the background accumulated by Colombia, the reports and testimonies provided by 13 similar commissions that have been functioning in the territory since 1958 (Jaramillo and Torres, 2015, p. 51). Moreover, parallel to the recent peace dialogues, worked a Historical Commission of Victims and the Conflict (CHVC), whose report² — which was established as a mandatory input for the Commission of Truth - was prepared within 6 months and submitted in February 2015. Little more than a year later, in 2013, the report ¡Basta ya! was published by the Group of Historic Memory of the National Reparation Commission (CNRR), which was created in 2007 for the demobilization process of the illegal self-defense groups.

Overall, such a baggage of diagnoses, given by the 13 previous commissions, has exceeded 17,000 pages. This is without considering that it has not been possible to organize the archives of all the commissions;

in other words, there seems to be "archives that are not known yet, for example, those of the public forces and those of the insurgency" (Jaramillo and Torres, 2015, p. 49). Such a collection allows us to affirm that the state has made attempts to deactivate the conflict, but, according to the investigative judgement, if commissions and derived diagnoses have failed, then the problem lies at the historiographical partidist assumptions that have followed those.

In fact, the CHCV report was imposed on the current CEV as an input, which "provides as the central axis of discussion an explanatory framework from the FARC and the Government [where] the work of the experts chosen by the Government was quite disjointed" (Jaramillo and Torres, 2015, pp. 18, 53). Therefore, this article takes the epigraph³ as a historiographical assumption and proposes as an objective to refer to the initiatives of the Military Forces to deactivate the internal armed conflict in Colombia from 1953 to 1961, since in this period a new conflict was incubated by Marxist-inspired armed groups (Sánchez, 1985).

¹ This article extract parts from a study being carried out by the authors regarding the reports of the Commissions of Truth in Colombia.

² CHVC. (2015). Contribución al entendimiento del conflicto armado en Colombia. 809 pp.

³ In a review of Marshal Montgomery, it is acknowledged in world history that "the military make the peace, after the politicians bring the wars" (Cano, 1970, p. 81); hence, if the objective of any strategy is peace, it is the responsibility of the politicians to ensure that it is lasting.



The historical analysis from a qualitative approach compares the military initiatives to deactivate the conflict at three different moments; to that end, it was based on the most recognized historiography to contrast it with newspaper reports of the time. In this sense, it is essential to emphasize that this article does not attempt to provide an exhaustive description of the period in mention, nor of each of these initiatives, neither of the political regime or the biography of the people involved. Accordingly, this document is divided into three parts, which, in turn, are suggested lines of research for the future: the first, on the civilian tradition; the second, contextualizes the “*Llanera*” demobilization; and the third, identifies the relationship between the truth commission and the military plans.

Coup d'opinion and civilist tradition

One of the most pronounced features of the military forces in Colombia has been their civilian character; in other words, the military's subordination to civilian power. While in other Latin American nations the anti-communist influence of the United States served as a legitimizing framework for the military to assume direct power, in Colombia there were at least two factors that ensured that the armed forces remained subordinate to civilian power and, therefore, that this foreign influence did not lead to a coup d'état. Firstly, the 'Rojas syndrome', i.e., the refusal of members of the Armed Forces to accept the convenience

of exercising political power directly. Secondly, above all, the absence of a tradition of military governments throughout republican history, in contrast to the vast majority of Latin American nations (Pizarro, 2017).


Concerning the first, the military government installed by Lieutenant General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in June 1953 was not only unexpected, but also the words of Liberal politician Darío Echandía, historically present, described this action as a coup d'état:

Your gesture was not the product of rapacious ambition, rather of a self-sacrificing sense of duty. You took command by virtue of a coup of opinion, since your efforts were not aimed at destroying the rule of law but at establishing it, not at imposed force over legality but to exchange anarchy for order (Echandía, 1953, July, 1, 15; underlined by the authors).

A few days later, the National Constituent Assembly, which was convened by the previous government, recognized Rojas as president and he took up his position with legitimacy.

What had begun as a national celebration in favour of the military government ended up as a political feast to the detriment of Rojas and the Armed Forces, because there was displeasure in the barracks due to the cynicism of the political elites, whose sectarianism had led the country to misfortune and now pretended to present themselves as the redeemers of the country: it was the 'Rojas syndrome'.

Uno de los rasgos más pronunciados de las Fuerzas Militares en Colombia ha sido su carácter civilista; es decir, la subordinación militar al poder civil.





The military government installed by Lieutenant General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in June 1953 was not only unexpected, but also the words of Liberal politician Darío Echandía, historically present, described this action as a coup d'état.

This is what General Luis Alberto Andrade said:

General [Rojas] put an end to the undeclared civil war, set up a Constituent Assembly with the participation of the two parties. When they saw their permanence in power threatened, they forgot the drama of the Llanos, Boyacá, Santanderes, Antioquia, Tolima, Huila and produced the 10 May [1957...]; therefore, it was instructive to see how the political caste, cynical and without moral authority, unashamedly accused the army of undue enrichment and the general of usurping power (Testimony, 1986, p. 14).

Regarding the second point - the absence of a militarist tradition in Colombia⁴ - even a recent critique acknowledges that

[...] political phenomena such as those experienced by other Latin American societies in the seventies and eighties of the previous century, known as the transition to democracy from previous authoritarian political regimes, have been an exception in our country. [Subordination to civilian power has been absolute, so much so that the] 'pronouncements' of high-ranking officers and tensions between the different presidents and the Ministers of War, first, and of Defense, later, or the commanders of the Army, always resulted in the retirement of the officers of the Armed Forces (Vargas, 2021, p. 114; the authors' details in square parenthesis).

This is why some consider Colombia to be a unique country which has civilians who love bellicose violence and military personnel who have generated spaces for coexistence, development and reconciliation, since they have been the ones who have had to suffer the wars ordered by others. However, the military, totally subordinated to civilian power and guarantors of the peace agreements and the contents of the Constitutions, are not recognized at all in certain intellectual spaces, of memory-building or in the courts (Mejía, 2021).

“Llanera demobilization”: Military Forces's initiative

Between 1948 and 1953, irregular armed groups operated in the Eastern Plains of Colombia. These were partly the result of traditional party governments, which treated members of the opposing party as mortal enemies and encouraged the action of such groups and political police. This led to the convulsion of large areas, mainly in Casanare, Meta and Arauca.

For almost five years, some extensive estates and crops were abandoned, and the trade came to a standstill, with very little being bought or sold. Hardly anything was taken out of the Llano, but, by order of the government, the entry of goods was also restricted. Within a few months, armed groups rose up against the conservative government. Overnight, they began to act like guerrillas, and their leaders adopted pompous titles which, in addition to give them command and authority, brought

⁴ From 1960 to 1980, 21 military coups occurred in South America in eight countries. Although these shared institutional and socio-political similarities, there were recurrent military coups in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru. In Venezuela, there were several attempted coups. Colombia was the democratic exception in the region (Duque, 2020).



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them closer to a legend (although research of the armed groups which were against them is still lacking).

In particular, in early 1950, Eliseo Velásquez abandoned his river transport business and convulsed haciendas, ports and towns; raided police stations; and promoted the nascent resistance that took up arms against the Conservative government. He was imitated by the three Bautista brothers, Guadalupe Salcedo, the three Fonseca brothers, the deserter army corporal Dúmar Aljure, the ex-police officer Jorge Enrique González Olmos, the Chaparro brothers, the landowner from Boyacá Eduardo Franco Isaza and others who imposed their law on the vast eastern territory.

Since the war leaders of the political parties had been unable to achieve peace for more than five years, it was up to the men in charge of making war to show their willingness to reach agreements. Thus, the military government, installed by General Rojas Pinilla in June 1953, heeded the call of a commission composed of 60 *llaneros* who expressed to the government their aspiration to seek formulas for reconciliation.

To improve the guerrillas's point of view, one of their leaders, Julio Fonseca, travelled to Bogotá with the intention of exploring the climate of pacification announced by the military government. Satisfied, he returned to the plains and acclimatized an atmosphere of harmony among the guerrilla leaders. This led to the letter that Guadalupe Salcedo, Dúmar Aljure, Jorge Enrique González and Humberto Paredes, among others, sent to the government, in which they expressed their desire for peace, as they had agreed, pledging their word, at the Monterrey post in 1953 (Franco, 1959; Puyana, 2001).

The demobilization of the guerrillas "*llaneras*" was covered, among others, by a Polish⁵ journalist who, in September 1953, wrote a special report. In it, she highlighted the highly sympathetic and humane spirit of General Duarte Blum, whom the president, General Rojas, entrusted with the task of receiving the rebels. This was written about the officer:

[...] The word 'peacemaker' usually has a negative meaning when referring to a military leader. But in the case of General Alfredo Duarte Blum, promoted last June to the rank of brigadier general and commander-in-chief of the Colombian armed forces, the word has its full positive and textual meaning (Kipper, 1953a).

Days earlier, in a report dated on 15th September, the journalist wrote:

[...] Then Dúmar Aljure, a slender and dark man, with a penetrating and authoritative look, inspected his troops; he turned on his heel, did the military salute to General Duarte Blum, and said: "general, reporting the guerrillas of Aljure's group to you". At the same time and from the other side, a man stepped forward and said: "general, reporting the conservative guerrillas of the peace of the region of San Martín to you [...]. The general inspected the two groups, shook hands and hugged each and every one of them; he spoke for a long time with a little seven-year-old fighter, who blushed (Kipper, 1953b).

Then, addressing to all of them, General Duarte said:

"The fight is over. We are all Colombians. We must forget and forgive our enemies and we must all work together to rebuild our country". Once again, the guerrillas

⁵ Anna Kipper, a Polish ethnologist, anthropologist and journalist for the Journal Française Agence (AFP), covered the demobilization and her reports were published by the liberal daily El Tiempo.




Figure 1. Peace returns to Colombians

Source: *Life* (1953, pp. 30-31)

presented arms: those who carried just revolvers and kept their hands free, clapped their hands, while the younger ones, with their hands over the seams of their trousers, leapt in place. Aljure, the leader of the Liberal guerrillas, passed to the side occupied by his Conservative enemies and shook hands with them (Kipper, 1953b).

Behind them were bloody skirmishes and assaults in which a considerable number of soldiers and policemen also were victims. One of the most memorable actions, due to the viciousness with which the guerrillas acted, was the ambush at The Turpial. On 12th July 1952, a National Army convoy that belonged to the "Vargas" battalion was patrolling along the right bank of the Meta River, near Puerto López. The detachment was integrated by young recruits who had just completed their training cycle, as well as officers and NCOs in command. Most of the soldiers were from the northern coast of the country and ranged in ages between 18 and 20; two young lieutenants, Alberto Gómez Restrepo and Rafael Caro, were in command of the convoy.

The area that the convoy was crossing was known as El Turpial, a sector where the trail gradually closed

until it dropped down into the river ravine. More than a hundred guerrillas were hiding in the bushes in that place, which was ideal for an ambush. Previously, they had cut through some logs on the path of the road and set up a firing base with automatic weapons, closing off any possibility of escape. The guerrillas unceremoniously killed 96 troops, including some of them who were wounded and stabbed to death.

Indeed, in a report about El Turpial, published in the Colombian journal, the journalist Héctor Polanía confirmed that the guerrillas, when they saw their leader fall as a result of a shot fired by a dying soldier, "[...] in a frenzied shouting, drunk with blood, they signaled the moment of the final assault with bayonet and knife. The charge was against a handful of defenceless men. Those who still showed signs of life were fiercely stabbed. They murdered those who surrendered and decapitated the ones who were dead" (Diario de Colombia, 1953).

A year after the ferocious ambush, in September 1953, the Rojas military government offered a hand to these same guerrillas. Salcedo and his co-religionists accepted the offer, announcing their "[...] sincere and spontaneous determination to lay down their

arms under the protection of the government and the flag of the homeland" (Communication, 1953). In the end, the desire for peace prevailed, leaving the fallen soldiers at El Turpial forgotten. But even so, as has happened at different times in our republican history, the military forces endorsed that ¡peace is victory!

First Commission of Truth and the Lazo Plan

Committed to peace and reconciliation, the Military Forces created the first Commission of Truth in Colombia, by Decree 0165 of 21 May 1958, which was signed by the Military Government, it established a team of eight members: two representatives from the Liberal Party, two from the Conservative Party, two from the Catholic Church and two from the Armed Forces. After several setbacks, it ended up with seven members.

The Liberal Party was represented by Otto Morales Benítez (who acted as coordinator) and Absalón Fernández de Soto; the Conservative Party by Augusto Ramírez Moreno; the Church by the clerics Fabio Martínez and Germán Guzmán Campos; the military by Generals Ernesto Caicedo López (active) and Hernando Mora Angueira (retired).

This Commission ended its work abruptly in January 1959, by decision of the Lleras Camargo government. A few years after the dissolution of the so called 'Investigative Commission of the Causes of Violence', part of its findings were consigned in a book entitled "La violencia en Colombia" (The violence in Colombia), which caused great impact; its authors were a cleric who was part of the Commission and a sociologist and a lawyer who were not part of it (Jaramillo, 2011).

Once the book was published, the Armed Forces showed great interest in studying it and learning from it; they also wanted to confirm the most sensitive areas for the implementation of civil-military action plans, such as the Lazo Plan. In August 1962, General Alberto Ruiz Novoa, Minister of War, asked the then Lieutenant Colonel Álvaro Valencia Tovar to carry out a detailed analysis of this work. The document was leaked and fell into the hands of the Conservative senator for Santander Darío Marín Vanegas, whom Ruiz Novoa had accused publicly of covering up bandits (El Tiempo, 1962a).

On 13 December 1962, the senator promoted a strong debate in the Congress, claiming that Valencia Tovar's report accepted the central thesis of the book's authors, in the sense that the Conservative Party was mainly responsible for the violence. In the middle of the accusations, Ruiz Novoa invited the political elite and other authorities in power to put aside their hatreds: "Three hundred thousand people killed by violence are asking you for peace, peace, peace [...]. We are at the service of Colombians and we will not allow the Armed Forces to be placed at



His idea was to create a strategy that would make it possible to confront the centers of violence in an integral manner, that is, not only by dealing with the armed dimension, but also with the accompaniment of the state as a whole, in order to effectively confront the objective causes of violence.



Photo: CEDOE photo archive.

the service of political interests" (El Tiempo, 1962b). Undoubtedly, the aforementioned book ran completely counter to the desire of the liberal-conservative elite of the recently inaugurated National Front to erase the past and, in particular, the responsibility that their actions and tendentious discourses had had in the violence.

It is worth remembering that Lazo Plan was designed by General Ruiz Novoa when he was commander of the army (1960-1962), together with his subordinates Rivas Forero, Landazábal Reyes, Robledo Pulido and Silvio Carvajal, among others. His idea was to create a strategy that would make it possible to confront the centers of violence in an integral manner, that is, not only by dealing with the armed dimension, but also with the accompaniment of the state as a whole, in order to effectively confront the objective causes of violence.

Ruiz Novoa's experience as General Comptroller of the Republic, during the military governments (1953-1958), allowed him to understand the country beyond the military perspective. He was also clearly influenced by the Frenchman Louis-Joseph Lebret, a Dominican cleric and member of the Order of Preachers. Lebret was contacted by the government of General Rojas Pinilla to go with his team to carry out a study on the conditions of the country's development; a task he began in 1954 and delivered in 1958 to President Alberto Lleras Camargo (Arbeláez, 2018).

The clergyman argued that the Armed Forces of countries like Colombia should not only fulfill a defensive function, but should be —quoting the French rural economist Jean Marius Gatheron— a "creative army", technically instructed to contribute to the development of the country. (Gómez, 2015).

Ruiz Novoa, clearly influenced by Lebret's study (1958), specified the definition of his military developmentalism, which was characterized by his interest in understanding the problems "under a different approach from the tradition of ideological belonging of the parties" (Villamizar, 2013, p. 291) and "[...] because of his vision that military resources could be placed at the disposal of economic and



"We are at the service of Colombians and we will not allow the Armed Forces to be placed at the service of political interests".



"Misery, ignorance, injustice: the sinister tripod on which the monster of violence is based. The examination of these three factors of their interaction, puts us on the road to an explanation of the historical events of our country in recent years".

social improvement" (Gómez, 2015). Because of that influence, the general referred to the clergyman's thesis in several of his writings; among them, there was one in which he stated that "[...] the defense against communism does not lie essentially in the force of arms. It lies in the elimination of social inequalities by following the democratic and Christian norms pointed out especially in the encyclicals *Rerum Novarum*, *Quadragesimo Anno* and *Mater et Magistra*" (Ruiz, 1965).

The Lazo Plan was also accompanied by a sociological analysis carried out by its military designers; for example, from his article "the people and their army" (1962), Landazábal Reyes set out a military vision of the origin and causes of violence in around thirty publications (including books and articles). In fact, one of his books, *factors of violence* (1975), published with the support of Belisario Betancur in Third World editions, was prefaced as one of its contents: "Misery, ignorance, injustice: the sinister tripod on which the monster of violence is based. The examination of these three factors of their interaction, puts us on the road to an explanation of the historical events of our country in recent years" (Landazábal, 1975).

Much earlier, in his article "ethic sense of war", Landazábal called the attention to the necessary observation and application of humanitarian principles in the conduct of hostilities (Landazábal, 1960; Castaño, 2020).

Today, the results of Lazo Plan can be consulted in the writings of army officers who confronted the bandits in the north of the Valle and Quindío (Betancourt, G., 1965; National Army, 1965). For example, General Valencia Tovar comments about the operational results:

In the first months of 1964, spectacular successes were recorded in the reduction of bandits. The VIII Brigade in Quindío and the north of Valle, the VI Brigade throughout the jurisdiction and the III Brigade in the rest of Valle and Cauca, managed to reduce the scale of rural banditry. The 'Caicedo' and 'Colombia' battalions, together with the Carabineros of the National Police, managed to eliminate the bloodthirsty trio of 'Sangrenegra', 'Desquite' and 'Tarzán', as well as many other bandits recalcitrant in crime and barbarity (Valencia, 1992, p. 432).

However, at the time, there were other foreign influences. On 24 December 1961, at the headquarters of the artillery battalion in Buga "Batalla de Palacé", a party was being held for the families of the cantoned troops. In the middle of the collective Christmas cheer, a terrible explosion was heard. A bomb had exploded, leaving a tragic toll of 51 dead and 108 wounded, including officers, non-commissioned officers, soldiers and civilians, old people, women and children. The individual who set off the terrorist device, Gustavo Nest Barrabás, who worked as a saddler, died in the explosion and was later found to be a member of the Peasant Student Worker Movement (MOEC). The bomb corresponded to the one illustrated in Annex 8 of the pamphlet "150 questions to a guerilla man", printed and

Conclusions

This article discussed the military forces' efforts to defuse the internal armed conflict in Colombia between 1953 and 1961 and highlighted three major points. Firstly, the military government that was established in 1953 to stop the political violence fomented by the traditional parties. Hence, the leaders of these parties welcomed the event as a "coup d'opinion", also confirming the civilian tradition of the Colombian military forces, which acted only to re-establish public security. Even when the political parties, seeing their hegemony of power threatened, brought an end to that government in 1957, the military not only returned to their barracks, but have continued to obey civilian power ever since.

Secondly, it was the same military government that, in 1953, promoted the demobilization and surrender of arms of irregular armed groups throughout the country. This was despite the fact that in the Colombian eastern plains, in particular, these groups had recently ambushed a National Army convoy and caused the death of 96 troops. The military government commissioned General Duarte Blum to personally coordinate the peace process in that region.

Thirdly, the last aspect referred to was that, in 1958, the transitional military government, or Military Council, created the first Commission of Truth, in which representatives of the main sectors of that moment took part. At the same

time, the National Army advanced integral development plans, which were promoted by the Army Commander, General Ruiz Novoa, between 1960 and 1962. In particular, the Lazo Plan was based on the concept of military developmentalism, underlying the French Le Bret mission, which had been brought by the previous military government. The report of that Commission, published in 1962 by Monseñor Guzmán, was accepted by the National Army and complemented its diagnoses.

It is worth noting that, in Colombia, the military forces adopted this military developmentalism in contrast to the anti-communist security doctrines promoted by the US and the new groups that imitated the Cuban model, including the MOEC group, which was responsible for the bomb attack that killed 51 people and wounded 108 at the headquarters of the "Palacé" battalion in Buga in 1961. In fact, despite this attack, the National Army dismantled an armed faction of the MOEC group in Vichada using actions to develop the rural population.

What has been written makes it possible to confirm that the Colombian armed forces have attempted to generate an integral response in order to achieve peace in the country. To ignore this would be the result of a traditional historiography narrated at the convenience of the various political parties; a narrative that has permeated the reports of the various commissions of truth when explaining the conflict. For this reason, it is imperative to

incorporate the vision of military history into the diagnostic baggage, in order to guarantee the non-repetition of the events.

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AUTONOMOUS WORK OF ENGLISH

FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ARMY OF COLOMBIA



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The importance of English as a foreign language has gradually intensified in each of the contexts and organizations present in society, including the Military Forces, since they are in charge of strengthening strategic connections to ensure the security of the nation and its correct performance globally.

The importance of English as a foreign language has gradually intensified in each of the contexts and organizations present in society, including the Military Forces, since they are in charge of strengthening strategic connections to ensure the security of the nation and its correct performance globally. Day by day, the members of the National Army of Colombia are trained in learning the English language more frequently to be promoted in their professional careers and increase the depth and exchange of knowledge with other armies and international institutions.

Currently, those exchanges continue to take place. For example, with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), since May 31st, 2018, in Brussels, Belgium, through which it is sought that Colombia be part of a series of cooperative relations to guarantee the defense of its territory (France 24, 2018) and to be able to provide education, training and instruction in areas related to the objectives and priorities of its military policy; likewise, the National Army has been relating to the American Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB), which aims to strengthen the fight against narcotics and advise the country in this important task (US Embassy Bogota, 2020).

Therefore, for the successful learning of a language it is not essential to travel or live in a country whose foreign language acquired is the official language; On the contrary, tools and resources can be obtained which allow to develop a more effective learning to enter the field of the same language. Thereby, it is about having creativity and motivation during the learning process and the practice that is generated after the academic period; mainly, it seeks to produce autonomous work strategies that are focused on real life situations, with the intention of facilitating the learning of the foreign language from a greater control.

First of all, autonomous work is the central axis that allows the practice of a foreign language in situations outside the academic field; for example, international commissions and alliances. Despite the above, putting this concept into practice is often avoided or tends to be misunderstood. Consequently, autonomous work is defined as self-interest with the aim of strengthening, expanding or diversifying the learning previously acquired or in which it is desired to make a foray, all this process accompanied by the capacity for self-regulation, in other words, the discipline, perseverance and organization present to carry out the activities (Achury, 2017).

Another fundamental aspect is the relationship between the student and the professor, since the last one is who generates strategies and provides resources and tools in order to produce interest in knowledge and its use in real life. This is how autonomy controls the student's learning process and uses the help of metacognitive strategies, such as evaluation,

planning, verification, self-regulation and criticism (Ministry of National Education, 2014).

At the same time, when engaging the learning and skill of a foreign language, the active practice of the communicative skills that make it up, such as oral and written production and listening and reading comprehension, must be generated. Specifically, oral production is understood as the speech that is carried out in the company of pronunciation, lexicon and grammar, evidencing sociocultural knowledge, customs and traditions that highlight the origin and the environment of origin, while simultaneously pragmatics highlights all those experiences that each person has had throughout the daily situations in his life and that produce as a result the expression of information, the opinion when speaking and communicating with other people in different contexts (Vázquez, 2000).

On the other hand, written production is considered as the process of organization, structuring and distribution of ideas, in order to produce a description, explanation and exemplification of the message to be transmitted. When forging the written production, a more complex communicative action is originated, because a detailed and stringent analysis of the lexicon, spelling and style must be generated; a process analyzed to a lesser extent when speaking. Something opposite to written production, where a greater analysis and interpretation of ideas is evidenced (Casigno, 2005).

Evidently, reading comprehension is defined as the set of opinion, information and enjoyment of certain texts that occur in everyday life. When reading,

cognitive and sociological factors are promoted that show the origin and academic background, resulting in a personal assessment and interpretation of the message, which produces an attitude of one's own under the experience. Reading comprehension is an active skill of knowledge and realization of it (Council of Europe, 2001).

Lastly, listening comprehension is specified as the action of decoding and understanding the received message. It is the active participation of the sense of listening and its connection with the brain response, which generates a similarity in the message sent, due to the same one that has desired to be transmitted is not always received, nor in the same way that it has been intended. Here the tone of voice, the emotions in each individual and the contexts in which they are executed in a given situation play an important role, resulting in a personal assessment (Council of Europe, 2001).

Case study of the intermediate course students of ESIDE

In order to obtain information on the way in which the members of the National Army carry out their autonomous work in this foreign language, a study was carried out on twenty students - officers and non-commissioned officers - who had graduated from the intermediate English course at the Army School of Languages and Dialects (ESIDE), whose purpose is to train military members to fulfill the objectives set out in the international scenario, such as those determined in the connections established



Inicialmente, se cuenta con el trabajo autónomo como el eje central que permite la práctica de una lengua extranjera en situaciones ajenas al ámbito académico; por ejemplo, las comisiones y alianzas internacionales.



between the Direction of International Relations of the Army (DIRIE) and the commissions abroad of the National Army Personnel Command (COPER).

The results of this study showed different language practices, once the academic process in the classrooms was finished. In the first question asked, it was inquired about the activities they carried out to continue practicing English as a foreign language. It was

obtained as a majority result that the graduate students preferred to watch series, movies or videos in that language in order to generate an entertainment action, without neglecting academic practice. As a less frequent action for the use of the language, the response was to attend conversational clubs or talk to relatives or acquaintances, because, due to work or personal factors, they did not have the necessary time to carry out this type of exercises.




Figure 1. Autonomous work after the learning course

Source: self-made

In the second question, it was inquired about which was the skill that they considered most important to strengthen. The result established a very high percentage of listening comprehension and oral production; Regarding the first, this evidenced great

coherence with the activities they carried out in their free time; Regarding the second, such a correlation could not be established, which allowed demonstrating a certain lack of autonomous strategies for the successful and effective practice of the foreign




Figure 2. Analysis of the survey made to graduate students (1)

Source: self-made

language.

Graduate students were then asked what communication skill they considered most important to their personal and professional lives. The results showed the preference in oral production as a primary competence for the assimilation and practice of the language. This question made it clear that the strategies, resources and tools used in the autonomous work of English have not been used in a

completely effective way, since the practice of oral production has not had the frequency required, nor desired, by part of the surveyed population.

Finally, the respondents were asked to make a recommendation on the most effective method of autonomous work —not without first emphasizing the importance of discipline, perseverance and the correct distribution of time so as not to forget the knowledge

learned—. Subsequently, they highlighted the value of being able to teach and practice the language in their military units, with or without the company of their superiors and subordinates, since they considered that this exercise motivated the rest of the personnel and became a habit of common interest that allowed obtain results in the short, medium and long term.




Figure 3. Analysis of the survey made to graduate students (2)

Source: self-made

As a final result of the study, it was concluded that the use of strategies that generate greater interest in learning and using the English language during free time is more effective. As for the activities that require greater socialization and practice in real situations, they are attending conversational clubs to interact with native speakers and exchange experiences, interact with ex-mates or people who practice the language constantly and write letters, emails or reports. All this, considering that, today, there are websites and applications that allow you to interact in real time with people in different countries, both by instant messaging and video calls. At the same time, in the military context, it is extremely pertinent to engage in activities related to commissions and

alliances with organizations such as NATO and SFAB.

It is very important to adapt the listening skill to different dialects and accents in English through movies, conferences, plays, documentaries or series —without subtitles, since even with the subtitles in that language, it would be more of a reading activity than a listening one—. It is also essential to read news, magazines, books, comics or texts that are of total interest or that are related to the professional field and use technology for the intended purpose by configuring mobile devices and accounts in the foreign language.

In the situation in which anyone wants to carry out more dynamic activities to practice the language, they can browse web pages or

download applications for mobile devices that offer karaoke, grammar activities, games to strengthen vocabulary —such as word search, crossword puzzles, hangman , memory and riddles—, among others.

Ultimately, teaching other people allows to learn and practice the language extensively in all your communicative skills, since the solution of personal doubts and those of others becomes an opportunity to improve the mastery and knowledge more and more.

Oral Production	Writing Production	Auditive Comprehension	Reading Comprehension
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Think in the language • Practice with acquaintances and friends • Read out loud • Sing • Record yourself • Translate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leave notes • Make letters, writings and emails • Chat 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Listen to music • Watch videos, movies, series and documentaries • Analyze podcasts and shows • Attend plays or conferences 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Read topics of interest • Update daily • Buy books • Configure devices and accounts in the language
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Uso de aplicaciones y sitios web <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enseñar a los demás 			

Table 1. Strategies for autonomous work in English
Source: self-made

Nacional International impact of learning English by members of the National Army

Thanks to the execution of autonomous work strategies in their process with English, the National Army personnel can seek to have an institution that is more qualified and ready to face the communicative challenges that arise on a day-to-day basis and those that will arise in the future. In this sense, students will always have teacher support, which will be essential to promote consistency in these habits and emphasize the importance of commitment to learning and the benefits in personal and professional life (Covarrubias and Mendoza, 2013; Klassen, Tze, Betts, and Gordon, 2011).

In addition, mastery of a foreign language, especially English, has promoted relations with the armies of America, Asia, Europe, Oceania, the Caribbean and multilateral organizations and has made it possible to carry out the translation of official documents in national or international affairs to in order to transmit accurate and precise information (DIRIE, 2021).

Consequently, it has been found that it is crucial to update knowledge, employ new resources and material, and acquire more information; therefore, it is essential to think of various dynamics and didactic strategies that preserve motivation and strengthen successful learning, with the intention that this entire process becomes

an interesting and fun path for each of the professionals.

Authors such as Díaz and Solar (2011) find that the role of memories and experiences of teachers have an important role in the filter of theoretical knowledge for its professional implementation, as is the case of international operations for the verification of the treaty of peace between Egypt and Israel, where members of the National Army actively participate (DIRIE, 2021).

The incursion of virtual education in society, and especially in the Armed Forces, should not be neglected, which has allowed soldiers to have constant training and perfect their personal and professional spirit in an integral way; for instance, it has also given them tools to advise their commanders in areas of international relations and support the progress of national defense.

Virtual education is a matter of rapid adaptation, which has been evolving in different fields of knowledge. Even when good practices favor the use of virtual and technological tools for virtual education, it is essential to carry out a continuous evaluation, because the result will depend on their performance (Durán and Estay-Niculcar, 2016).

The previously obtained results evidence that learning a language, like any other type of knowledge, requires constant practice. The use of a foreign language cannot remain in the classroom, nor in a



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virtual course, it must be carried out in real life practice, so that each person can see how capable is of consolidating the knowledge and take advantage of them.

In international contexts, the National Army has a good position, in that it has been able to meet the structural, conceptual and interoperability needs that today's challenges have presented to nations and has kept its vision of the future clear. The national, regional and global dynamics have required an effort of cooperation and contribution to security and defense in environments that not only require that the capabilities, skills, knowledge and expertise of the soldiers of the country be provided, but also depend of bilingualism as a fundamental part of achieving interoperability in the pursuit of common goals.

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